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I. INTRODUCTION
Credit is an important instrument of acquiring command overthe use of work-
ing capital, fIxed capital and consumption goods. In the wakeof Green Revolution,
land and labour havereceded into the background aspredominant factors of growth.
Use of capital and adoption of modern techniques of production which have be-
come major sources of growth of agricultural output necessitate access to credit
markets for financing their use. Institutional sources of credit have become quite
,ignificant duringthe last fewyears. The rapid expansion of credit from institutional
sources can be seen from various indicators. The total disbursement of agricultural
loans has gone up from Rs. 306.75 million in 1972-73 to Rs. 5,102.14 million in
1981-82. On a per acre basis, the loans increased from Rs. 7.33 in 1972-73 to
Rs. 106.83 in 1981-82. In this perspective, the disparities in income and wealth in
rural areas would crucially depend on the distribution of capital among farms of
different sizesand occupational groups. Neglectingequitable distribution of credit as
a policy instrument for rural income redistribution may be a seriousomissionby the
policy-makersinterested in an improvement of rural equity.
It is easy to suggest a link between credit and distribution but diffIcult to
establish the exact relationship between the two variables. Income-distribution
effects of the credit delivery may depend on (i) recipients of credit, i.e. the size
and type of farm on which credit is used, (ii) the price paid for the borrowed funds,
and (iii) productivity of the activities financed by credit. Weshallpresent evidence
on each of these aspects to get an idea of the impact of credit on the redistribution
of income in rural areas.
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Section II describesthe broad features of the credit market and credit relations
in rural areas. The reforms in the credit distribution system are the subject matter
of Section III. The final section sums up the conclusions and suggestssome areas
for further policy action.
II. ACCESSTO THE CREDITMARKETANDCREDIT RELAnONS:
A FACTUALBACKDROP
Information about the recipients, cost and use of credit is based on data
obtained from a Rural Credit Surveyconducted in 1972-73, at which about 100,000
rural households were enumerated. The details of the surveyhavebeen presented by
Qureshi in [2]. Information on various indices of borrowings and the pattern of
its use by different categoriesof households ispresented in Table 1.
The table shows that about 35 percent of rural households had negotiated
some form of loan during the survey year. The proportion of households reporting
borrowing exhibits significant variation from one occupation to another. This
proportion was lowest for non-farm households and highest for tenant households.
A slight positive relationship between the size of holdings and the proportion of
borrowing households is noticed. The variation in the proportion may be traced to
a number of factors operating on both the supply and demand sides of the credit
market. The credit supply may be availableto a greater extent to occupations with
larger incomes and higher levelsof wealth since such occupations may be relatively
more credit-worthy. The demand for consumption credit may be high for occupa-
tions with low incomes while the demand for working and fixed capital may be low
for suchoccupations.
The amount of borrowing per rural family was Rs. 531. The corresponding
borrowing was Rs. 650 for cultivator households,Rs. 634 for absentee landlords and
Rs. 324 for non-farm households. The borrowing per family ispositivelycorrelated
with the sizeof farm. Theborrowingsper familyalsoincreasedwith an improvement in
the status of tenure as owners exhibit a higher level of borrowings than tenant
households.
The distribution of credit is also highly unequal. Farm households are 63
percent of rural households but they obtain 77 percent of the rural credit. The share
of non-farm households is much lower in credit than their relative share in the
number of rural households. Owner, owner-cum-tenant and owner non-operator
households appropriate a greater proportion of credit than their proportion of rural
households, while all other categoriesof households get lessthan what their numbers
would indicate.
Sourcesof Credit
The duality in rural money markets is often a characteristic feature found in
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differences as regards the sources available for obtaining credit for different cate-
gories of households. Information on the percentage distribution of loans obtained
from different sources indicatesthat the non-institutional sourcesof credit are domi-
nant suppliers of credit for all categories of households and, within the category of
cultivator farms, for allsizesof farms. In the caseof allrural households, 89 percent
of the credit was provided by non-institutional sources. The dependence on such
sources was least in the case of absentee landlords and most for tenant households.
The dependence on the unorganized credit market was a decreasingfunction of the
size of farms. Farms of less than 5 acreshad obtained 99 percent of the credit from
non-institutional sources while this proportion was only 71 percent for farms larger
than 50 acres.
Within the non-institutional sourcesof credit, friendsand relativesare the most
important sources of credit for all categories of households and all sizes of farms.
In the case of tenants, land-ownersare alsoan important source. Commissionagents
and traders are another important source of credit for most categoriesof households
but especiallyfor owner and non-farm households. Professionalmoney-lenders and
factories do not figurevery prominently for most categoriesof households.
Of the institutional sources of credit, the Agricultural Development Bank of
Pakistan (ADBP)and commercialbanks are the most important sources. Commercial
banks are especially important in the case of absentee landlords while the ADBP
isan important source of credit for land-ownerhouseholds and for largefarms.
Cost of Credit
It is commonly believed that rates of interest in the non-institutional credit
market are very high in developing countries and that such rates in the organized
credit market are deliberately kept low by the government policy. Table 2 presents
data on money rates of interest actually chargedby different credit agencies.
The most important finding that emergesis that the rates chargedby the non-
institutional agencies, though higher than the rates charged by institutional credit
agencies,are not outrageously high. The averagerate of interest was 10.13percent
for the combined category of both the institutional and non-institutional
loans. The percentages were 8.16 and 15.34 for institutional and non-institutional
Table 2
Distribution of A verage Rate of Interest and its Variance by
Source of Borrowings
Useof Credit
An examination of the various purposes for which borrowed funds were used
showsthat consumption expenditure, including non-productive items of expenditure,
was the singlemost important purpose of borrowings asit accounted for 48 percent
of the total borrowings for all rural families, 45.6 percent for non-farm families,
42 percent for absentee land-owners, 57 percent for tenants and 47 percent for
owner households. In cultivator households, borrowed funds were used to fInance
34.42 percent of capital expenditure on farm, 8.59 percent of working capital ex-
penditure on farm and 7.71 percent of non-farm business expenditure. In the case
of non.farm households, 46 percent of total borrowings were for non"farmbusiness
expenditure. Borrowings for consumption purposes show a negative relationship
with the size of farm while borrowings for capital and current expenditures show a
positive relationship with the size of farm. Non-farmbusinessexpenditure fInanced
through borrowings was also important for owner and owner non-operator house-
holds. The most important finding that emerges is that a large proportion of the
borrowed funds is used for productive purposes even by the rural poor who include
tenants, smallfarmers and non-farm households.
MeanInterest Rate Standard
Credit Sources








Sub-Total: A 8.16 1.82
B. Non.lnstitutional







Sub-Total: B 15.34 11.63
AllSources: (A+ B) 10.13 7.06
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loans respectively. The highest rates were charged by the professional money-
lenders, with the marketing intermediaries, landowners, friends and relatives, and
factories following them in this order. It is also interesting to note that almost all
non-institutional agencieshad chargedmoney rates on some of the loans advancedby
them which shows that those of their agents who reported zero rates on their ad-
vanceswere either givingincorrect information or were charginghigh implicit rates of
interest to compensate for the practice of not chargingexplicitly any rate of interest
on loans advancedby them.
In the case of the non-institutional sources of credit, most (more than 95
percent) of the loans were without any interest. Only factories advanced loans
without interest to the tune of 70 percent of their advances. Whether any implicit
interest was charged or not could not be gleaned from the availableevidence. Since
the interest rate on the non-institutional credit ishigher than the interest rate on the
institutional credit and the rural poor borrow largely from the non-institutional
sources, the cost of credit and the economic strength of rural borrower are inversely
related. The poor not only pay a high rate of interest but are also largelyexcluded
from the institutional credit. Since the cost of institutional credit is relativelylow,
there is an excess demand for credit in the institutional credit market. The rate of
return on borrowed funds is artificially high. The lenders need not concern them-
selveswith the end-use of the credit so long as they are assured of full and timely
repayment of the loans. For this reason, the lenders follow a policy of security-
based lending. Since lending is linked to the availability of collateral, the accessto
the institutional credit becomes proportional to the assetsowned. Giventhe skewed
distribution of land in the rural areas, it is not surprisingthat a highly unequal dis-
tribution of credit was observed to obtain in rural Pakistan. The highcost of credit
and the limited accessto the credit market have prevented the rural poor from ex-
panding the base of their production activities.
III. INSTITUTIONAL CREDITREFORM
The analysis of credit market and credit relations in the previous section shows
clearly that the rural poor, composed mainly of small farmers and non-farm house-
holds, have limited accessto the institutional credit. The empiricalresults showthat
the larger a farmer is, the more likely he is to benefit from the institutional credit.
This situation is a result of the lending policies which link credit availability to
"credit-worthiness". The empiricalfmdingson the debtor's losinghisland and other
assets to professional money-lenders or other commercial non-institutional lenders
was not clear-cutas rates of interest were not found to be ashighas in other develop-
ing countries. Nevertheless it can safely be argued that the institutional credit
may have worsened income distribution by providing low-cost capital to large land-
owners and absentee landlords.
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III
The equity case for ensuring a larger flow of credit to the rural poor needs no
argument and flows directly from the policy-maker's greater weight in the social
welfare function for the welfare of the poor. The efficiency argument for a redis-
tribution of institutional credit runs parallel to the case for a land reform. To
improve the distribution of credit, various policy steps have been taken in Pakistan
since the early 1970s. Only a brief description of some of the important policy
initiatives and a preliminary evaluation of selected policies adopted in Pakistan are
presented.
The 1972 Banking Reforms and the nationalization of commercial banks in
1972 had assignedan important role to the State Banknot only to increasethe flow
of credit to the agricultural sector but also to redistribute it in favour of small
farmers. A scheme for agricultural loans was introduced by the State Bank in
December 1972. An AgriculturalCredit AdvisoryCommittee was also constituted to
estimate credit requirement each year for the agricultural sector. The distinctive
features of the innovations are many. Firstly, the institutional agencieswere urged
to move away from the traditional criterion of credit-worthiness in that the banks
could advance loans against expected increased production and against personal
sureties. Secondly, quotas are fixed for each bank to encourage their lending in
support of agricultural and rural development. The non-observanceof these quotas
leads to an imposition of penalties in the form of non-interest-bearingdeposits with
the State Bank. Thirdly, a pass-booksystemwasintroduced to expedite the approval
of institutional credit against land mortgage. The pass-book is a legal document
which contains a complete record of the land owned by a particular farmer. Any
institutional lender can grant a loan on the security of land by just recordingan entry
in the pass-book. Fourthly, quotas of production credit for different sizesof farms
are fixed under the AgriculturalPurposes Rules, 1973. Under these rules, 70 percent
of institutional loans must be advanced to farms of less than 12.5 acres,20 percent
to farms between 12.5 acres and 50 acres, and 10 percent to farms larger than 50
acres. Initially these targets were in respect of small loans. In 1980-81 the entire
amount of credit to be provided by commercial banks to the agriculturalsector was
to be treated as a mandatory target. There is also an element of concession in the
rate of interest on agricultural loans relative to commercial and industrial loans.
Interest-free production loans to small farms are also granted up to a limit for the
purposeof financingthe use of seeds,fertilizersand pesticides.
The Agricultural Credit Advisory Committee works out the agricultural credit
requirement each year. On the basis of the available data on acreageunder each
crop in each province and observed input-to-acreage ratios for different crops,
total physical input requirements are estimated. Using input prices, input require-
ment is worked out in value terms. Accounting for farmers' own savingsand their
a.ccessto private credit market, an estimate of the total credit supply from institu-
tJonallending agenciesisworked out.
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Measuringthe impact of credit reforms on rural equity isnot easy. Almost all
government policies affect the distribution of income. Isolatingthe impact of chan-
nelled official credit from the impact of other policies isan impossibletask on both
conceptual and empirical grounds. The concern with an improvement in the welfare
of the small farmers through increased flow of channelled credit isevident from the
fixation of quotas and the provision of interest-free loans even to small farms. The
introduction of commercial banks in the agricultural lending has proved to be quite
effective. The loans from banks have increased sharply. The introduction of super-
vised credit schemes by some of the credit institutions has also been a positive
policy development.
A recent study by National Fertilizer Corporation [1] relating to the
production loans by commercial banks shows that smaller farmers do not benefit
much from such loans.
The distribution of credit by farm size according to both bank records and
Farmers' Survey diverges drastically from the prescribed pattern of distribution.
Farmers owning less than 12.5 acres, who should receive at least 70 percent of the
total credit, get only 61 percent accordingto bank records and 48 percent according
to the Farmers' Survey data. Farms ranging in area from 12.5 acres to 50 acresget
more than their prescribed share according to both the sources of data while farms
of more than 50 acres get less accordingto the bank data and more accordingto the
Farmers' Surveydata. Proxy loaningwas quite extensiveasthe bank records showed
borrowers who were not traceable on the addressshown in the banks' ledgers.Incen-
tives for proxy loaning are provided by interest-free loans to smallfarmers. Influen-
tial borrowers seem to be the real beneficiary of such policies. It is clear that no
effective institutional monitoring set-up has been evolved to supervisean effective
enforcingof the credit reforms.
Though the pass-book system was introduced in August 1973, yet by 1982
only a small minority of farmers had obtained the pass-books. The proportion of
small farmers obtaining such documents was only 29 percent while 91 percent of the
farmers owning more than 50 acres had obtained the pass-books. The official cost
for obtaining the pass-book was only Rs. 6 per pass-book. The unofficial cost of
Rs. 205 per pass-book is quite high. The high cost plus bureaucratic hurdles have
perhaps denied the smallfarmersthe advantageof the pass-book system.
There is also a contradiction between a credit reform which is small-farmer-
oriented and the lending practices of credit institutions which concentrate on loans
for lumpy investments. The Agricultural Development Bank provides credit mainly
for purchase of tractors, installation of tubewells and special projects. The small
subsistence farmers are unlikely to invest in lumpy investments. Thiscontradiction
in the lending behaviourindicates clearly the gapbetween intentions and practices.
IV. CONCLUSIONSANDPOLICYIMPLICATIONS
The foregoingdiscussionof the structure of rural credit market and the institu-
tional credit reforms needs no elaborate summary. Only broad conclusionsand their
policy implicationsneed to be highlighted.
Firstly, the dominant role that the non-institutional sources of credit play for
the rural poor is quite clearly borne out. Information about the hidden interest
rates was not available. The interest rate on the non-institutional credit is much
higher than the interest rate on the institutional credit. One implication of this
pattern of credit distribution is that the cost of credit is inversely related to the
economic strength of the rural borrowers. A proper accounting of the hidden and
implicitcosts would strengthen this conclusion.
Secondly, the price paid for institutional credit in Pakistan has been kept low
by the government. Maintaininglow real rates of Interest has adverseconsequences
for income distribution. Lowinterest rates alwaysimply an excessdemand for loans
and require lenders to ration the credit not on the basis of productivity of credit
but on considerations of credit-worthiness. The rural poor, comprising small land-
owners, tenants and non-farm households, had very little collaterals of the kind
acceptable to the institutional lenders. The low real rate of interest results in an in-
stitutional bias in favour of large land-owners, absentee landlords and rich traders
in the rural areas. The use of credit by such groups to finance new capital-intensive
technologies diminishes the demand for labour and worsens the pattern of income
distribution.
Thirdly, the approach adopted by the AgriculturalCredit AdvisoryCommittee
in estimating the credit needs is incomplete for policy purposes. It estimates the
demand for credit on the basis of historically observed cropping pattern and input
use. There is a need to take into account the credit requirements arising from the
adoption of new technologies. In this regard, the need for further research isquite
urgent.
Fourthly, the institutional agenciesneed an encouragement to moveaway from
their preference of mortgage security for agricultural loans. No hard evidenceon the
default rates by farm size is availablein Pakistan. The informed guessisthat default
is more common with the influential large farmers who havebeen most reluctant to
repay loans and most able to resist government pressures to repay loans. Some of
the commercial banks have started supervised credit schemes. A careful reviewof
such efforts should suggest the most effective way of extending loans to the rural
poor on a l~rgescale.
Fifthly, the institutional credit reform of the kind implemented in Pakistan has
not been effective, primarily becauseof the existingunequal distribution of land and
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Sixthly, the provision of credit may help the poor only temporarily. Lasting
improvement cannot be expected unless production relations are equitably restruc-
tured. The experience of the pass-book system and of credit quotas for the small
farmer in Pakistan clearly indicates the need for a land reform prior to the credit
reform. Large land-owners expropriate a large share of cheap institutional credit
despite any legislativeor executiveprovision to the contrary. Inequitable working of
the economic and social institutions is a major factor explaininglimited benefits for
the poor. Leakage of credit earmarked for the rural poor is a serious problem.
Separate specialinstitutions for lendingonly to the target group may be established.
Seventhly, the success of any credit programme is contingent upon a favour-
able policy framework and an infrastructural programme forruralareas. Forexample,
if terms of trade are biasedagainstthe rural poor, additional credit may not havethe
desired impact. The importance of social and eonomic infrastructure also needsno
highlighting.
Eighthly, the uses for which additional rural credit is provided should be
technically sound. The new technology should be provably profitable if credit
support for its adoption isasked for.
Lastly, paucity of data on the relevant variablesis a problem for carryingout
more rigorous analysis. There is a need for research in all aspectsof the rural credit
asa supportive devicefor a proper designingof a credit policy for rural development.
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Comments on
"Rural Credit and Rural Development:
Some Issues"
I congratulate the authors on presenting a paper on a subject of vital signifi-
cance to rural development. The authors have succeeded in providing insightsinto
the utilization pattern of credit in the rural society. The paper givesa brief reviewof
the PassBook Scheme and the 1972 Bank Reforms. These changeswere effected to
help in the attainment of national goals. For reasonsbest known to the authors their
description of policies does not adequately capture the policy developments since
1973. Besidesthe Pass Book Scheme,an easyand convenient procedure for advanc-
ing credit has recently been introduced. Now a farmer can get loan by simplypro-
ducing a certificate and a singleapplication form instead of producing a longlist of
documents. A certificate about the bona fides of the applicant and the land under
his cultivation can now be issued by any dependable and responsible person of the
village,besidesthe chairman of the Union Council,Lumbardar, or Zaildar. Secondly,
one single form has replaced the nine documents previouslyrequired for the purpose
of obtaining production and development loans. The Supervised Credit Scheme
(SCS), though in operation since the early '70s on a limited scaleby the National
Bank of Pakistan, has meanwhile been extensively enlarged in its coverage. The
AgriculturalDevelopment Bank of Pakistan, which alone accounts for 37 percent of
total institutional credit, provides as much as 64 percent of its loans under the
SupervisedCredit Scheme. The State Bank of Pakistan, too, had been directingthe
banks to patronize the supervisedcredit scheme. In fact, banksareurgedto bringtheir
whole agricultural loaning system under the umbrella of this scheme. Interest-free
loans are being given to small farmers having land holdings up to 12%acres in the
Punjab and the NWFP, 16 acres in Sindand 32 acres in Baluchistan. Sugarand ghee
millstoo arrange credits for the growers. The main objective of the credit policy is
to help the smallfarmer.
. The credit limit of 70 percent for the small farmers, as mentioned by the
authors, can not be correctly evaluated with the data of the NFC survey. The NFC
survey has certain drawbacks. For instance, it covered only a limited number of284 Mushtaq Ahmad Comments 285
farmers and confined itself only to the institutional credit flowingfrom commercial
banks.
The major findings which emerge from the paper are that the small farmers
do not get the 70-percent shareof institutional loansas stipulated by the agricultural
rules of 1973. The reasons explainingthe failure to obtain the stipulated amount of
credit include the linking of credit availability to credit-worthiness, proxy loaning,
the cost of pass-book,and bureaucratic hurdles.
Some facts need to be set right before I proceed further. The mandatory
limit set for the commercial banks' credit to the small farmer wasabout 50 percent
of the total agricultural credit. According to the NFC's Farmers' Survey, 48 per
cent of the total agricultural credit issued by commercial banks wasreceivedby the
small farmers. Their share stood at 60 percent in the case of the ADBPloans in
1982-83. Thesefacts alsoshowimprovement overtime.
I must emphasize here that there are certain characteristics of both the large
and small farms which must be kept in view. For instance, large farms will get
inherently more loans as they are capital-deepeningwhilethe smallfarmsare labour-
intensive and thus have a high propensity to replace capital with labour. It is but
natural that their share in the overallcredit pie would be disproportionate to their
share in total farms. I mean here they will be getting less credit per holding as
against the large farms whose capital-cum-labourstructure is more heavily tilted to-
wards the former variable;but as far as credit availability per acre isconcerned, the
smallfarmer isstill favourablyplaced.
Proxy loaning is nothing but an extension of credit to other landholders. In
certain cases,proxy loansmay ultimately benefit the medium or smallfarmers.
The authors have found faults with the credit procedures, suggestingthat as
far as the issuance of Pass Books was concerned the small farmer was the one who
faced difficulty in having access to the book. The fact, however, is that the small
farmer was neither in a position of getting the so-called'desired' credit, nor in need
of it. With the introduction of improvement in credit policy, the farmer isnow in a
position to obtain easilythe supervisedcredit.
Demand for credit is a function of many factors, such as rate of return, finan-
cial constraints, levelof technology, degree of commercialization of agriculture and
stage of development. These independent variables need to be looked into before
one could pass any judgement about the fulfilment of the credit requirements of
the small farmer. Notwithstanding this fact, incentives in the credit policy signifi-
cantly contribute to pushing up the demand for credit. The farmer has his own set
of opportunity costs and works out the economics which finally determine his
decisions. The authors need to undertake quite an extensive exercise based on a
much larger data-coveragebefore they can achievemeaningfulresults. Despitethese
limitation of analysis,however, the authors havepresented quite a useful scenarioof
the existingpattern of credit supply. Their study, if used carefully, can surelyhelp
in instituting qualitative improvement in the formulation of national credit policy
for the rural sector.
Economic Analyst,
Ministry of Finance,
Government of Pakistan,
Islamabad
Mushtaq Ahmad